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The European Union has an implementation “deficit”. The measures adopted by
the EU are not always applied – or are not applied correctly – by all Member States.
This is a serious problem. If a culture of compliance is to be fostered in the EU,
Member States would need to learn from the experience of those Member States
that appear to be more successful at complying with EU rules. At the same time they
should learn about the “typical” mistakes made by Member States so as to avoid
them. The Commission is naturally placed to identify both “good” and “bad”
practices and promote “best” practices.
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The Compliance Problem
in the European Union1
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Introduction
The European Union has an implementation “deficit”. The
measures adopted by the EU are not always applied – or
are not applied correctly – by all Member States. This is a
serious problem. As has been expressed by the European
Commission in its Strategic Objectives for 2005-2009,
“failure to apply European legislation on the ground
damages the effectiveness of Union policy and undermines
the trust on which the Union depends. The perception that
‘we stick to the rules but others don’t‘, wherever it occurs,
is deeply damaging to a sense of European solidarity….
Prompt and adequate transposition and vigorous pursuit of
infringements are critical to the credibility of European
legislation and the effectiveness of policies.”
One of the fundamental principles in the EC Treaty is the
“loyalty” of Member States. to the Community through
prompt compliance with its rules. Article 10 EC provides
that “Member States. shall take all appropriate measures…
to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty… They shall facilitate the achievement of the Com-
munity tasks [and]… they shall abstain from any measure
which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of
this Treaty.”
Every year the Commission initiates hundreds of pro-
ceedings against Member States before the European
Court of Justice in an effort to induce them to comply with
their obligations.
According to the latest available annual report of the
Court, which refers to 2004, the Commission initiated 193
proceedings against Member States. During the same year
the Court found in 144 cases out of a total of 155 that a
Member States had failed to fulfil its obligations. This
means that in more than 90% of cases the Commission was
right to take action against one or more Member States.
The issue of compliance is broad and has many different
aspects: legal, political, institutional (administrative) and
economic. Member States may fail to comply because they
are unwilling [domestic political opposition], unable [legal
& administrative obstacles; lack of human and material
resources], or unaware of their obligations.2
In this article we consider only two aspects of compliance
that are currently on the political agenda. First, we ask
whether the non-implementation problem can be remedied
by a change in the legal instruments through which EU law
is applied. Second, we examine whether a tougher policy
towards non-complying Member States could induce them
to apply EU law correctly and more quickly.
Available statistics indicate that close to 80% of the
infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice concern
directives. Less than 20% of court cases involve non- or mis-
application of regulations.3 This is true at all stages of the
three-stage procedure laid down in Article 226 [i.e. letter of
formal notice, reasoned opinion, opening of a court case].
The complexity of many EU rules, which in itself often
makes implementation difficult, is compounded by the fact
that directives require transposition by Member States.4  For
this reason it has been suggested that the implementation
of EU law and policies could be improved if the EU relied
more on regulations and less on directives.
This is a reasonable view. First, transposition introduces
an extra stage in the process of applying EU rules. At a bare
minimum it causes delay. The Commission classifies as
infringement also failure by Member States to notify that
directives have been transposed, i.e. incorporated into
national law, by the set deadline. The XXIst Report on
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Monitoring the Application of Community Law indicates
that 60% of infringement cases refer to non-communication.5
Second, the transposition of directives through enabling
national legislation offers an opportunity to Member States
to add extra provisions making legislation even more com-
plicated [the so-called “gold plating”]. More complex
measures are presumably more difficult to apply and enforce.
Third, Member States have to interpret the general
principles laid down in directives and develop the precise
instruments and procedures through which to give them
effect. These instruments and procedures may vary from
Member State to Member State reflecting differences in
national legal and administrative systems. The identifi-
cation of the appropriate
instrument that fits the pur-
poses of each directive may
lead to errors of interpreta-
tion. Similarly, newly-esta-
blished procedures may suf-
fer from teething problems.
Given that directives have
certain inherent weaknesses,
the natural solution to these
problems appears to be
beguilingly simple: just eli-
minate the need to transpose
EU law. This is a strong argu-
ment in favour of regulations
that must be applied uni-
formly by all Member States.
It indeed raises an impor-
tant question. Does the choice
of legal instrument weaken
or strengthen the compliance
of Member States with the
requirements of EU law?
Our view is that directives
cannot really be aban-
doned. And even if some-
how they are replaced by
regulations [so that trans-
position becomes unneces-
sary] legal and institutional
adaptation and innovation
within Member States will
not be avoided.
At the same time, the
Commission, in an effort to
induce Member States to comply with their obligations, has
adopted a policy of tougher penalties for infringements.
We do not think that such a tougher approach will be an
effective deterrent to non-compliance.
We begin our analysis by examining in more detail the
issues arising out of the choice between directives and
regulations and then consider the likely success or not of the
tougher approach to infringements.
The directives v regulation conundrum
A fast-growing body of literature applying economic concepts
to the assessment of law suggests that rational agents
would comply with costly rules only if non-compliance
would be even more costly.6 This would be the case
whenever the penalty for non-compliance is larger than the
expenditure required for compliance.
Assuming that Member States act as rational agents, the
choice of legal instrument by the EU must be irrelevant to
the willingness of Member States to abide by EU law as long
as there is no effect either on the probability of detection or
the size of the penalty for infringements. Penalties for
infringements are determined according to the severity of
the violation of EU law and the length of that violation. Since
the severity appears to be independent of the form of the
legal instrument, it follows that the most significant factor
that could influence the behaviour of Member States is the
probability of detection of a violation.
Indeed, the argument in favour of regulations has to
explain, first, why Member States would be more inclined
to comply with regulations
than directives and, second,
why misapplication of regu-
lations can be detected more
easily.
Let us consider the merits
of the first issue. If there
were a fundamental pro-
blem with directives, as op-
posed to regulations, then
we should expect to see that
all Member States have
difficulties. Yet, the statistics
on infringement of Com-
munity law reveal that a
handful of (older) Member
States consistently account
for close to half of all cases.
For the period 1997 to 2004
[that is the latest year for
which statistics exist in the
public domain], four coun-
tries – Belgium, France, Ger-
many and Italy – accounted
for over 45% of all infringe-
ment proceedings in the
EU15.7
This information on its
own would suggest that the
implementation deficit is not
an EU-wide problem but a
specific member-state pro-
blem. If Greece and Spain
are added to Belgium,
France, Germany and Italy,
then they reach over 60% of all cases.8  This does not
support the view that there is a generic problem with
directives.
Since these are some of the original or older Member
States, inexperience or unfamiliarity with EU rules cannot
be a significant explanation.
Also, it cannot be the case that these countries are
persistently outvoted in the Council and are forced to adopt
rules they do not like. It is unlikely, therefore, that their
problem is one of being on the losing side at the decision-
making level.
What is more likely to happen is that countries which are
either unwilling to comply or have internal problems in
applying EU law exploit the leeway given to them by
directives.
Versluis provides a taxonomy of the prevailing expla-
nations of non-compliance.9 She groups them in three
According to the latest
available annual report
of the Court, which
refers to 2004, the
Commission initiated
193 proceedings against
Member States. During
the same year the Court
found in 144 cases out
of a total of 155 that a
Member State had failed
to fulfil its obligations.
This means that in more
than 90% of cases the
Commission was right to
take action against one
or more Member States.
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categories: intentional flouting of the rules when they are
contrary to national interest, domestic administrative weak-
ness, distinct national preferences or traditions. Con-
sequently, the proposed remedies to non-compliance are
stiffer penalties, strengthening of administrative capacity10
and development of common preferences (“socialisation”).
We see later whether penalties are stiff enough.
Infringement statistics reveal that most problems occur
in particular policy fields. This suggests that the “acquis
communautaire” is more difficult or complex in certain
fields.
Let us turn now to the second issue, namely that it may
be easier to detect infringements of regulations because
they are more precise. Once more, however, the record
indicates otherwise. There are many more cases against
Member States before the European Court of Justice
concerning directives than regulations.
Although it is commonly held that directives are more
problematic because they force national administrations to
interpret them, we unfortunately do not have any statistics
that prove that they are indeed inherently more difficult. It
is important to note that even the fact that directives require
transposition does not necessarily mean that regulations
can be put in effect with no further national action. They
may also require legal adjustments and extensive
administrative adaptation.
Consider, for example, Council Regulation 1/2003 that
implements Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. Article 35
of the Regulation stipulates that “the Member States shall
designate the competition authority or authorities responsible
for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in such
a way that the provisions of this regulation are effectively
complied with. The measures necessary to empower those
authorities to apply those Articles shall be taken before 1
May 2004. The authorities designated may include courts.
When enforcement of Community competition law is
entrusted to national administrative and judicial authorities,
the Member States may allocate different powers and
functions to those different national authorities, whether
administrative or judicial.”
Although most Member States had national competition
authorities in existence before 1 May 2004, the date on
which the Regulation came into force, there was no require-
ment that such national competition authorities enforced
EC law. In some Member States, there was a need for
considerable institutional innovation and adaptation so as
to be able to comply with that Regulation.
To summarise so far, apart from the fact that some
Member States seem to break EU law more frequently than
others, there is no convincing evidence that directives are
inherently more difficult to apply. Directives must be
transposed, but regulations too may need extensive
institutional and legal changes. Since no data exist on how
Member States comply with regulations, we cannot conclude
that they are easier to apply.
T T T T Table 1: able 1: able 1: able 1: able 1:
Number of infringement cases brought before the Court of Justice (new actions, by Member State) Number of infringement cases brought before the Court of Justice (new actions, by Member State) Number of infringement cases brought before the Court of Justice (new actions, by Member State) Number of infringement cases brought before the Court of Justice (new actions, by Member State) Number of infringement cases brought before the Court of Justice (new actions, by Member State)
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Total%
EU15 124 118 162 157 157 168 214 193 1293 100%
Belgium 19 22 13 5 13 8 17 13 110 8%
Denmark 01102232 1 1 1 %
Germany 20 5 9 12 13 16 18 14 107 8%
Greece 10 17 12 18 15 17 16 27 132 10%
Spain 7679 1 5 1 1 2 8 1 1 9 4 7 %
France 15 22 35 25 20 22 22 23 184 14%
Ireland 61 01 31 41 2 81 6 3 8 2 6 %
Italy 20 12 29 22 21 24 20 27 175 14%
Luxembourg 8 8 14 11 10 12 16 14 93 7%
Netherlands 331 1 2559 1 3 5 1 4 %
Austria 04887 1 5 2 0 1 4 7 6 6 %
Portugal 15 5 13 10 7 10 10 7 77 6%
Finland 01043168 2 3 2 %
Sweden 01133255 2 0 2 %
United Kingdom 1164 1 1 1 58 1 2 5 8 4 %
Source: Eurostat
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The need for a mixture of policy tools
A general principle of public policy is that a policy tool is
abandoned not when it is imperfect – they are all imperfect
to varying degrees – but when a more effective tool can be
adopted. Consider what could happen if directives were
abandoned.
Directives tend to contain more general principles which
have to be made operational by Member States. This
means that if directives were dropped, regulations would
have to be made more general and their application in
each particular case would be subject to a greater degree
of interpretation by the Member States than at present.
Hence, detection of misapplication would also become
more difficult.
This immediately raises another question. Should the
EU, then, rely instead on detailed rather than general
regulations? The answer is no. Bilal and Nicolaides have
argued that optimum policy enforcement relies on a mixture
of specific and general rules.11 Specific rules require no or
little interpretation and therefore are easy to apply. Their
disadvantage, however, is that they tend to be narrow in
scope. By contrast, general rules, which are wider in scope,
need to be interpreted and determine whether and how
they may apply to each particular case. This makes them
costly. It follows that optimum enforcement is a balancing
act between the narrowness of the rules and the ease of
applying such rules.
If the EU would replace directives with detailed
regulations, it would simply replace one problem with
another. Making common rules more detailed, so as to
improve detection, will come at the cost of making regulation
less flexible and more cumbersome.
There is also the extra cost of potentially excessive
homogeneity across the EU. Directives allow Member
States to experiment and to learn from each other. This is
valuable in those sectors where it is not obvious which
implementing method is superior. One of the propositions
of the principal-agent theory is that the principal must allow
some leeway and discretion to the agent whenever the tasks
of the agent cannot be defined with sufficient precision.12
Non-implementation can be contagious and
addictive
No or faulty implementation of EU rules is a serious
problem. It undermines both the substance of those rules
and confidence in the process of integration. The success of
European integration depends to a significant extent on the
faithfulness by which Member States comply with their
contractual obligations.
Since their record is imperfect, it is natural to believe that
legal action against non-complying Member States is the
perfect remedy. Consider, then, what may happen if the EU
T T T T Table 2: able 2: able 2: able 2: able 2:
Infringement cases brought before the Court of Justice (by policy area) Infringement cases brought before the Court of Justice (by policy area) Infringement cases brought before the Court of Justice (by policy area) Infringement cases brought before the Court of Justice (by policy area) Infringement cases brought before the Court of Justice (by policy area)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total %
Total 169 147 214 197 187 204 277 219 100%
Agriculture and fisheries 38 14 49 37 26 32 31 29 16%
Environment, health and 34 10 34 33 49 57 54 40 19%
consumer protection
Enterprises 0 0 4 13 4 10 15 11 4%
Research & education 000000100 %
Competition 9 9 22 15 10 9 20 7 6%
Internal Market 4 19 15 21 21 23 24 30 10%
Justice and home affairs 40 45 44 31 28 36 54 51 20%
Energy and Transport 10 23 18 15 16 9 23 19 8%
Employment and social affairs 10 10 11 11 6 8 21 17 6%
Taxation and Customs union 13 12 12 13 14 12 19 5 6%
Regional policy 202000721 %
Enlargement 110111120 %
External relations 330451011 %
Economy and finance 000202231 %
Other 513174522 %
Source: Eurostat
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relies only on the legal proceedings initiated by the Com-
mission in order to induce Member States to respect their
obligations.13
Surprisingly, any Member State, especially the new
ones, may conclude that non-compliance “pays”. It takes
time for the Commission to detect an infringement, initiate
proceedings before the
Court and get a ruling fin-
ding that infringement has
indeed occurred. But even
with an adverse ruling, the
Member State concerned
can still procrastinate. The
Commission will have to
initiate new proceedings
and request that the Court
imposes a fine on that
Member State for failing to
comply with the previous
ruling. It is after the second
ruling that the Member State will start paying and actually
feeling the “pain” of non-compliance. In the mean time, it
could have “gained” anything between four and eight years
of non-compliance.
In July 2000 Greece became the first Member State to
be fined for not complying with EU law. The Court imposed
a daily fine of € 20,000. It took Greece six months to comply
and ended up paying a total of € 4.7 million. In November
2003 Spain became the first Member State to be fined twice
for the same infringement. Its penalty was modest; only
€ 625,000 per year. In July 2005 France suffered the
largest penalty ever which was both a lump-sum of € 20
million and a daily fine of € 320,000.
Recently the Commission announced a new tougher
policy on the determination of fines for non-compliance. In
the future it will ask the Court to impose both lump sums
and periodic penalties for each day of non-compliance.
Under the new method, fines are calculated on the basis of
a formula that starts with a standard flat rate [€ 600] which
is then adjusted upwards depending on the severity and
time length of the infringement, and the size of the economy
of the Member State concerned.
But even this new tougher policy may not be dissuasive
enough. The following example illustrates the problem.
Assume that a new Member State, say Cyprus, considers
whether to comply immediately with a new EU law or just
ignore it because, say, it is too costly to establish the
requisite institutional structure. The reason why Cypriot
authorities would be facing that dilemma is that the
government is in the process of reducing its budget deficit
and public debt so as to qualify for membership of the
Eurozone in the next 18 months.
If we assume that the prospective infringement is average
in severity [the scale is 1 to 20] and it concerns failure to put
EU law on the Cypriot statute books which suggests that the
time length would be short [the scale is 1 to 3] and taking
into account the small size of the Cypriot economy [the
scale reflects the size of GDP and the number of votes in the
Council], it is likely that the daily penalty will be around €
8,000. In addition, there will be a lump-sum. The minimum
amount for Cyprus has been set at € 350,000. This means
that if it takes Cyprus, say, six months to rectify the problem,
the total fine will be about € 1,800,000.
If Cyprus will have to pay € 1,800,000 after, say, six
years of non-implementation of EU law [the assumed
Yet, the statistics on
infringement of Community
law reveal that a handful
of (older) Member States
consistently account for
close to half of all cases.
period from the initiation to the conclusion of legal pro-
ceedings] that makes it about € 300,000 per year. Even for
a small country that amount does not appear to be too
dissuasive. In the case of France which last year paid a fine
of € 20,000,000, the infringement concerned failure to
apply a 1991 directive! The annual cost of its infringement
was less than € 1.5 million
over that 14-year period.
For a large country, too,
non-compliance may be
cheap.
Of course, the real costs
are likely to be much higher.
There is the cost of the
human resources which are
diverted to managing court
cases. There is also the risk
of national courts awarding
damages [provided EU law
creates rights for indivi-
duals14]. But above all, there is the cost of failing to reap the
benefits of integration and common EU policies.
But to politicians who are more concerned about
protecting the interests of their constituencies and keeping
the political promises they have made, an amount of €
300,000 per year may be a gamble worth taking. For
French politicians the length of the infringement also
provided some “comfort”. Those who took the decision not
to apply the directive in 1991 are probably no longer in
office while those who have to pay the fine have the excuse
that it was not their fault. The length of legal proceedings
in the EU provides a natural cover for non-conforming
governments.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that infringement penalties
are still too small and infringement proceedings too long
for them to be an effective disincentive to non-compliance.
Moreover, we think it would not be good for the public
image of the EU to raise penalties even more. Although, in
principle, individuals are deterred from breaking the law by
the severity of potential penalties, Member States may not
react in the same way precisely because those who make
the decision to flout the rules are unlikely to be the ones that
will have to bear the consequences. At any rate, high-
profile conflicts between EU institutions and Member States
will not contribute positively to the development of a climate
of cooperation and may create a hostile public attitude
towards the EU.
Conclusion
Implementation, compliance and enforcement are unlikely
to be improved through exhortation, penalties which are not
tough enough or increased reliance on regulations rather
than directives. If urging Member States to act in the common
interest or threatening them with legal action were sufficient,
the situation would have improved a long time ago.
Shifting from one legal instrument to another is an
untested approach, but apart from eliminating the need for
transposition, it does not appear to have any other
advantage.
The solution must be sought in other approaches. But
whatever approach is chosen, it seems to us that a ne-
cessary first step is better understanding of why Member
States fail to fulfil their obligations. Perhaps surprisingly, the
Commission letters of first notice, reasoned opinions and
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subsequent arguments before the Court of Justice and the
rulings of the Court that find infringements do not explain
why they have occurred.
If a culture of compliance is to be fostered in the EU,
Member States would need to learn from the experience of
those Member States that appear to be more successful at
complying with EU rules. At the same time they should learn
about the “typical” mistakes made by Member States so as
to avoid them. The Commission is naturally placed to
identify both “good” and “bad” practices and promote
“best” practices.
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NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
* Dr Phedon Nicolaides, Professor – EIPA Maastricht
Helen Oberg, Student Assistant – EIPA Maastricht.
1 We gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions we
have received on earlier drafts by Edward Best, Simon Duke
and Maria Kleis.
2 There is a voluminous legal and political science literature on
the implementation of EU law. For extensive reviews see, for
example, J. Vervaele, Compliance and Enforcement of Euro-
pean Community Law, (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999), P. Craig,
and G. De Burca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed.,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and J. Tallberg, Paths
to Compliance: Enforcement, Management and the Euro-
pean Union, International Organization, 2002, Vol. 56, pp.
609-643.
3 The terms “directive” and “regulation”refer to the legal instru-
ments defined in Article 249 of the EC Treaty.
4 Note, however, that there are multiple reasons for defective
implementation of directives. These reasons range from
political unwillingness to administrative weaknesses and dif-
ferences in legal traditions. They also vary from Member State
to Member State. For more information see E. Versluis,
Explaining Variations in Implementation of EU Directives,
European Integration online Papers, 2004, vol. 8, no. 19,
accessed at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-019a.htm.
Accordingly, the remedies also vary. Please see the research
programme and the various papers on Better Regulation by
the European Policy Centre accessed at www.theepc.be.
5 COM(2004) 839. Accessed at “http://europa.eu.int/comm/
secretariat_general/sgb/droit_com/pdf/XXI_rapport_annuel/
21_rapport_annuel_en.htm“.
6 See, for example, D. Friedman, Law’s Order: What Economics
Has to Do with Law and Why it Matters, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000); S. Shavell, Foundations of
Economic Analysis of Law, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,
2004).
7 Strangely, these counties are the ones which by any standards
are regarded to be the most “communautaire” or the most
fervent supporters of deeper integration.
8 See “http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgb/
droit_com/index_en.htm“
9 E. Versluis, Compliance Problems in the EU: What Potential
Role for Agencies in Securing Compliance? University of
Maastricht, paper presented at the 3rd ECPR conference, 8-10
September 2005, Budapest.
10 The Commission, for example, has recently proposed that
“one senior member of government, at Minister or Secretary
of State level, is designated as being responsible for monitor-
ing the transposition of all internal market Directives into
national law.” See Commission Recommendation of 12 July
2004 on the transposition into national law of Directives
affecting the internal market, OJ L 98, 16/04/2005, p. 47-52.
11 S. Bilal & P. Nicolaides, Regulatory Instruments and Enforce-
ment in Regional Blocs, Aussenwirtschaft, 2002, no. 2.
12 See M. McCubbins, R. Noll & B. Weingast, Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and
the Political Control of Agencies, Virginia Law Review, 1989,
Vol. 75, pp. 431-482.
13 Proceedings against failure to implement EU law may also be
initiated by businesses or individuals before national courts.
The difference between EU and national courts is that dam-
ages may be awarded only by national courts. We ignore this
possibility in our analysis because we have no data on any
awards for damages made by national courts against public
authorities in the various Member States. Nonetheless, it
should be noted that national courts play a significant role in
proceedings that clarify the obligations of Member States. This
is indicated by the fact that many landmark cases on the
obligations of Member States have originated in national
courts through references for “preliminary ruling”. National
courts make these references in order to request the opinion
of the European Court of Justice on matters of interpretation
of EU law. In general references for preliminary ruling account
for about half of the workload of the Court.
14 Individuals can indeed take action against public authorities
and demand compensation for damages they have suffered
due to non- or faulty implementation of EU rules. This principle
has been established by the landmark rulings in the Factortame,
C-213/89, and Francovich, C-6/90, cases.
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